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The Future of NLRB Doctrine on  
Captive Audience Speeches
†
 
PAUL M. SECUNDA
*
 
“The Board is . . . entitled to suspicion when faced with an employer’s benevolence 
as its workers’ champion . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “Act”),2 as interpreted by the 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) over the last 
sixty years, employers have been permitted to give captive audience speeches at 
work to employees contemplating unionization.
3
 Employees must attend such 
meetings, may not be able to question the employer representative, and may not 
have the union come to the workplace to present opposing views.
4
 Not surprisingly, 
these speeches are one of the most effective anti-union weapons that employers 
currently have in their arsenal.
5
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2012 Paul M. Secunda. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to 
thank Professor Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt and the Indiana Maurer law faculty for inviting me 
to participate in this Symposium on Labor and Employment Law Under the Obama 
Administration: A Time for Hope and Change? I am indebted to Michael Duff, John 
Higgins, Jeff Hirsch, Joe Slater, and Andrew Strom for their insightful and helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this article. I dedicate this article to my law students, who have been a 
constant source of enjoyment, inspiration, and pride over the years. 
 1. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).  
 4. See NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 8, 10–11 (8th Cir. 1974); Litton 
Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968); Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 811–12, 
815 (1967). 
 5. Although there is an older study by William Dickens suggesting that captive 
audience speeches have statistically significant effects on voting in union certification 
elections, William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification 
Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 574–75 (1983) 
(concluding that employers’ written communications, captive audience speeches, threats, and 
actions taken against union supporters all have statistically significant effects on voting in 
union certification elections), perhaps even more illuminating are recent statistics 
establishing the percentage of employers who use such tactics and how often they use them, 
KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON 
WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 73 (2000), http://digitalcommons.ilr. 
cornell.edu/reports/3/ (report indicating that 92% of 400 employers engaged in captive 
audience meetings during union organizational campaigns and that employees were subject, 
on average, to eleven captive audience meetings during such campaigns). See also William 
B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-
Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 
484 (2007) (citing San Diego Gas & Elec., 325 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1146–47 (1998)) (“[T]he 
captive audience technique, in which employees are called together on company time and 
124 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:123 
 
 
In previous articles, I have alternatively argued that states should be able to 
legislate against such captive audience meetings free from NLRA preemption;
6
 that 
such employer meetings amount to coercive conduct against employees in 
derogation of their section 7 right to organize;
7
 and that in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court campaign finance decision in Citizens United v. FEC,
8
 employers 
will likely expand the use of captive audience speeches from the union campaign 
context into the political campaign context, and thus, federal legislation is required 
to prevent this from happening.
9
 These prior articles sought to establish the danger 
to employee-workplace rights caused by permitting unfettered, employer captive 
audience meetings at the workplace. In response to these concerns, I have set 
forward different approaches that the federal government, states, courts, and the 
NLRB could take to eliminate or minimize the impact that this type of employer 
conduct has on employee rights. 
This contribution to the Symposium, Labor and Employment Law Under the 
Obama Administration: A Time for Hope and Change?, focuses on perhaps a more 
pragmatic issue: the likely future of Board doctrine in the area of employer captive 
audience speeches. Not only does this not involve the more difficult questions 
concerning NLRA preemption when states seek to legislate in this area, but it also 
does not discuss whether Supreme Court decisions in the election law area have 
made the workplace riper for employers to give labor, political, and/or religious 
captive audience speeches and the consequent need for protective federal 
legislation in this context.  
This Article seeks to answer a series of narrower, and yet more practical 
questions, now that the Board has both a quorum and a Democratic majority.
10
 The 
                                                                                                                 
company property, has proved to be an extremely devastating technique in organizational 
campaigns. It is so devastating a technique that when the Board instituted postal ballots in 
limited circumstances in the 1990s, emphatic dissents were registered by the Board’s 
Republican members on the ground that balloting over an extended period of time, which 
would allow the employees to get their ballots at their home addresses, would deprive the 
employer of an a opportunity to use anti-union speech.”). 
 6. See Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address 
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
209 (2008). I have also advocated for the validity of the Oregon anti-captive audience 
meeting law in Associated Oregon Industries v. Avakian, No. CV 09-1494-MO, 2010 WL 
1838661 (D. Or. May 6, 2010). See Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 09-CV-1494-MO, 2010 WL 
1838661 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2009). The case was eventually dismissed in favor of defendants 
on non-substantive standing grounds. See Associated Or. Indus., 2010 WL 1838661, at *5. 
 7. See Paul M. Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove”: Employer 
Captive Audience Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 FLA. INT’L. U.L. REV. 385 (2011). 
 8. 130 S. Ct. 876, 885 (2010) (holding “that the Government may not suppress political 
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity,” and that “[n]o sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”). 
 9. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings 
in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2010). 
 10. The Board operated for twenty-seven months with a two-member Board and decided 
over 500 cases. Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Case Production in FY 2010: Rising Numbers 
in an Eventful Year 1 (Oct. 7, 2010), http://nlrb.gov/news-media/news-releases/archive-
news. The U.S. Supreme Court in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644–
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first question in this series of inquiries must be: what is the likelihood that the 
Board will hear a case concerning captive audience speech in the near future? 
Second, if the Board reviews such a case, what are the chances that a Board 
majority will limit the rights of employers to engage in captive audience speeches? 
Third, and perhaps most interesting and difficult to predict: if the Board overturns, 
to some extent, current doctrine concerning this type of employer activity, what 
will be the reasoning that the Board utilizes to reach its conclusion? 
On the first question, it is difficult to speculate when, or if, a captive audience 
case will make its way to the Board for decision, although there do appear to be at 
least a few case presenting captive audience issues currently pending NLRB 
review.
11
 Uncertainty also arises in this area because of the way in which Board 
procedures work
12
 and because it is unclear how long the Board will remain with a 
Democratic Board majority.
13
 Of course, chances for review also depend on 
whether the Board will again become incapacitated through not having the required 
three-person quorum,
14
 and how long President Obama remains in office.
15
  
                                                                                                                 
45 (2010), invalidated those decisions based on the Board not having at least a three-member 
quorum of its normal five-member complement. As of October 2011, the Board has three 
members including two Democratic members (Chairman Pearce and Member Becker) and 
one Republican member (Member Hayes). See The Board: The Members of the National 
Labor Relations Board, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board.  
 11. See Newburg Eggs, Nos. 3-CA-27834 & 3-RC-11918, at 11–12, 14 (A.L.J. Div. 
Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/search/advanced/all/%28case%3A03-CA-027834%29 
(finding violations occurring during captive audience meetings and setting aside election); 2 
Sisters Food Grp., Inc., No. 21 CA 38915, at 18–19 (NLRB, June 10, 2010), 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-038915. The union in 2 Sisters Food Group, Inc., actually 
asked the Board to completely outlaw captive audience meetings. No. 21 CA 38915 at 18 
(“[T]he Board should use this opportunity to prohibit captive audience meetings by the 
employer during the critical period.”). 
 12. Only the NLRB General Counsel can issue a complaint upon a formal charge that 
the employer or union engaged in an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006). Of the 
24,720 unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges filed in 2005, only 38.5% were found to have 
merit and resulted in the General Counsel issuing a complaint. Charges and Complaints, 
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/chartsdata/chargeComp#chart1tag. In FY 2010, the Board 
issued 315 decisions in contested cases. See Press Release, NLRB, supra note 10. Moreover, 
it is even more difficult to have an election objection reviewed by the Board given the 
deferential review standards in this context. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (1965) (outlining the 
limited basis for Board review of Regional Director's decisions in the representation case 
context). 
 13. Board members are either appointed for five-year terms, or the president appoints 
them through the recess appointment process. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). At the end of their 
appointment period, their Board service ends, or they are appointed for an additional term. 
See id. Members serve staggered five-year terms; a different majority may be appointed 
within three years of the appointment of a new president. Id. More recently, Board 
appointment has become a highly partisan process. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the 
Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1398 
(2000) (maintaining that partisan Board appointments have become the norm at the NLRB 
over the last thirty years). 
 14. See Press Release, NLRB, supra note 10 (describing how the Board can become 
incapacitated if its numbers drop below an acceptable quorum of three members). 
 15. Chairman Liebman’s third term expired on August 27, 2011 and Member Becker’s 
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Nevertheless, assuming for present purposes that the Board decides such a case 
with the current Democratic majority, my prediction about the future of board 
doctrine in this area may be simultaneously unsurprising and surprising. 
Unsurprising, on the one hand, because I do believe the Democratic majority will 
seek to limit the number and frequency of captive audience speeches based on the 
view that such conduct substantially limits the ability of employees to freely decide 
whether they wish to join a union. Surprising, on the other hand, because I believe 
the Board will likely not prohibit all captive audience meetings as they could, and 
should, under current law.
16
 Rather, the Board is likely to engage in a more 
restrained approach based on already-existing doctrines and cases, given the 
Board’s desire to avoid the misimpression that it is merely engaging in politically 
motivated flip-flopping.
17
 
In short, I believe the Board will choose to take one of two paths, depending on 
how the captive audience speech issue comes to the Board. First, the case could 
come to the Board primarily as an election case, where the Board determines 
whether a group of employees wishes to be represented by a union. If there are 
objections by the union to the running of the election based on employer captive 
audience speeches and their impact on the “laboratory conditions” of the election,18 
the Board could intervene and force a rerun of the election, or even order 
bargaining between the parties in an especially egregious case.
19
 In fact, under the 
                                                                                                                 
recess appointment expires at the end of 2011. Board Members Since 1935, NLRB, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935; Craig Becker, NLRB, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/craig-becker. At that point, there is a possibility that 
the Board may again fall below the three-person quorum necessary to decide cases. See 
NLRB Chair’s Departure Raises Questions About Agency’s Future, HRHERO.COM (Aug. 30, 
2011), http://blogs.hrhero.com/hrnews/2011/08/30/nlrb-chairs-departure-raises-questions-
about-agencys-future/ (“In addition to [Chairman] Liebman’s departure, member Craig 
Becker’s term ends December 31. Those developments leave many questioning whether the 
NLRB will be left crippled in a political environment not conducive to replenishing the 
membership.”). 
 16. See Secunda, supra note 6, at 409–10 (“Based on employee free choice, the 
conduct/speech distinction, and the threadbare nature of NLRB precedent in this area, the 
Board should return to its Clark Bros. doctrine and make employer captive audience 
meetings a per se violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.”). 
 17. Adjudicatory agencies like the NLRB need to have credibility with parties on both 
sides of the dispute. See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive 
Conduct, Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 51, 54 n.11 (2004) (“Board decisions driven by political considerations negate the 
Board’s claim of superiority in deciding labor disputes based on industrial experience and 
expertise and compromise its stature as a neutral independent agency.”). 
 18. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“[T]he Board’s function [is] to 
provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly 
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”). 
 19. The ability of the Board to order an employer to recognize a union and bargain in 
good faith with it on a contract is referred to as a “Gissel Bargaining Order” (GBO). See 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610–16 (1969). As Professor Weiler aptly 
observed many years ago, however, GBOs tend to be ineffective. See Paul Weiler, Promises 
to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1769, 1794–95 (1983). They only give the union the right to bargain, not the right to “direct 
the employer to make a reasonable contract offer.” Id.at 1794. In any event, even Democratic 
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Peerless Plywood doctrine,
20
 the Board has already articulated an election rule that 
neither the employer nor the union may give a captive audience speech twenty-four 
hours before a representation election. So, if the Obama Board wishes to provide 
additional protection against employer captive audience speeches, including anti-
union speech by supervisors, it could move to extend the period during which 
captive audience speeches are prohibited from the current twenty-four-hour rule to 
a week or two before the actual holding of the election.
21
  
In doing so, the Board could choose to focus on an aspect of its historical 
treatment of captive audience meetings that has been largely ignored over the last 
fifty years. For example, in Economic Machinery Co., the Board held that “the 
technique of calling the employees into the [e]mployer’s office individually . . . is, 
in itself, conduct calculated to interfere with . . . free choice . . . regardless of the 
noncoercive tenor of an employer’s . . . remarks.”22 In subsequent cases, the Board 
expanded this doctrine to find employer conduct objectionable “where it can be 
said on reasonable grounds that, because of the small size of the groups 
interviewed, the locus of the interview, the position of the interviewer in the 
employer’s hierarchy, and the tenor of the speaker’s remarks, [the Board is] not 
justified in assuming that the election results represented the employees’ true 
wishes.”23 Although the Board in Mead-Atlanta Paper Co. held that large group 
meetings did not have the same coercive influence as small group meetings,
24
 fifty 
years of caselaw involving captive audience speeches have provided adequate 
empirical data that such an observation may need to be revisited by the Obama 
Board.
25
 Surely, the Board would be free now to rely upon industrial experience in 
this area post-Mead-Atlanta to conclude that it was previously wrong in finding 
that larger meetings would foster “free and open discussion.” Indeed, it is well 
within the discretion of the Board to find “as a matter of industrial experience”26 
that the policies of the Act are not effectuated by allowing unfettered employer 
                                                                                                                 
Boards have been reluctant to issue GBOs in recent years. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Yes, 
Virginia, There Still Are Gissel Bargaining Orders, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Nov. 21, 
2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2007/11/yes-virginia-th.html. 
 20. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). 
 21. To the extent that Congress enacts some form of expedited election legislation, 
expanding the Peerless Plywood doctrine could be quite effective. 
 22. 111 N.L.R.B. 947, 949 (1955). 
 23. E.g., NVF Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 663, 664 (1974). 
 24. 120 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1958) (“It is the isolation of individuals, or of small groups 
of employees, most often just a few, from the bulk of their fellow workmen into the locus of 
managerial authority which supports the inference that company expressions of anti-union 
sentiment in these circumstances borders too closely upon coercive influence over their 
choice later expressed in the election.”).  
 25. See Secunda, supra note 7, at 391–99 (discussing captive audience meeting cases 
post-Taft-Hartley). 
 26. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958). Twenty years later, an 
acquaintance who had been subjected to successive captive audience speeches remarked that 
when he attended blue collar captive audience meetings during organizing drives it was the 
first time the employer had ever held a massed, all hands on deck meeting of any kind. As a 
result, many of his coworkers were simply terrified and it took them the better part of several 
days to restore esprit de corps.  
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captive audience speeches to large groups of employees in the critical period before 
the election. 
Second, a case may come to the Board primarily as an unfair labor practice case 
challenging the use of captive audience tactics. In that instance, the issue would 
instead be whether the nature of speech under section 8(c) of the Act causes it to 
fall under one of the exceptions to employer free speech protection.
27
 If the speech 
in question can be seen as either a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit,”28 existing Supreme Court and Board precedent permit a finding of an 
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) against the employer.
29
 Of course, this 
finding would not only cause an election to be rerun, but would also lead to the 
granting of other forms of appropriate relief, which might include a more liberal 
use of access remedies
30
 for the union to speak to employees on company 
premises.
31
 
This unfair labor practice approach to captive audience speech would be 
different from current Board practice in two meaningful ways. First, the Board 
would more closely scrutinize challenges to employer speeches made in captive 
audience settings to determine the coercive nature of the speech under the specific 
circumstances of the case, rather than simply rely on the conclusory statement that 
such speeches are permitted under current Board precedent. Second, the Board 
could apply a presumption of employer coercion where employees are faced with 
losing their jobs if they decide to leave the meeting, or where they are refused the 
ability to interact with and question the speakers.
32
 This presumption of coercion 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) 
(2006); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617–19 (1969) (“[A]n employer is free 
only to tell ‘what he reasonably believes will be the likely economic consequences of 
unionization that are outside of his control,’ and not ‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken 
solely on his own volition.’” (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 
1967))); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (“The danger inherent in 
well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”). 
 30. See generally Robert M. Worster, III, If It’s Hardly Worth Doing, It’s Hardly Worth 
Doing Right: How the NLRA’s Goals Are Defeated Through Inadequate Remedies, 38 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 1073, 1076 (2004) (“‘Access remedies’ allow unions to communicate with 
employees free from employer reprisals, whereas ‘notice remedies’ inform ‘employees of 
their statutory rights and the legal limits on the [e]mployer’s conduct’ while assuring them 
that ‘further violations will not occur.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Teamsters Local 115 
v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399–400 (D.C. Cir. 1981))). 
 31. It has been observed in some professional circles that captive audience speech 
coupled with the inability of the union to reply to this speech makes the situation 
hypercoercive. An access remedy like the one issued in Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB, 
227 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2000), may well provide a partial remedy to this hypercoercive 
situation.  
 32. The adoption of an employer coercion presumption in this context would effectively 
overturn NLRB v. Prescott Industrial Products Co., 500 F.2d 6, 9–11 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(refusing to enforce an NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning 
during a captive audience meeting constituted an unfair labor practice); Litton Systems, Inc., 
173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (indicating that “[a]n employee has no statutorily protected 
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could be applied based on the recognized power disparities between employers and 
employees,
33
 based on unions’ lack of access to employer property to disseminate 
pro-union messages,
34
 and based on the fact that neither the First Amendment nor 
section 8(c) of the Act give employers the right to compel unwilling employees to 
listen to non-work-related speeches they do not wish to hear.
35
 The employer, 
however, could overcome this presumption by satisfying a modified form of the 
Struksnes polling test
36
 to assure the noncoercive nature of such captive audience 
speeches. Such a showing would ensure that employees were told the purpose of 
such meetings, were assured against retaliation for asking questions during these 
meetings, and were not otherwise intimidated by their employer’s speech or 
conduct.  
In all, then, this Article predicts that the Obama Board will seek in some manner 
to more closely regulate employer captive audience speeches. Part I provides a 
general background on employer captive audience speeches in the labor law 
context. Part II considers how the Obama Board might respond to an election case 
raising captive audience issues. Part III alternatively explores how the Obama 
Board might deal with an unfair labor practice case involving employer captive 
audience tactics, and suggests, in the process, the adoption of a presumption of 
employer coercion where employer captive audience speeches are utilized. In all, it 
is likely that the Obama Board will change the contours of its captive audience 
speech doctrine for the first time since Babcock & Wilcox,
37
 the Board decision that 
first established the legality of employer captive audience speeches in 1948.
38
  
                                                                                                                 
right to leave a [mandatory antiunion captive audience] meeting”); and Hicks Ponder Co., 
168 N.L.R.B. 806, 815 (1967) (upholding an employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union 
workers who speak out once captive audience meetings have begun). 
 33. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (“[A]ny balancing of [Section 8(a)(1) and 8(c)] rights 
must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and 
the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended 
implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”); 
see also NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (“Employees during working hours are the classic captive 
audience.”); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (“Few audiences are more captive than 
the average worker.”). 
 34. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that an 
employer may prohibit non-employee union solicitation on its property unless the location of 
the plant is so remote that the union is unable to communicate with employees through its 
own reasonable efforts); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538–39 (1992) 
(holding that the Babcock inaccessibility exception is narrow and generally only applies to 
remote locations such as logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels). 
 35. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a 
right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 537–38 (1945) (finding that employers may have the right to persuade their employees, 
but “[w]hen to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it 
that character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has been passed”). 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 140–45 (explaining how Struksnes employee 
polling standards could be modified to apply to captive audience meetings in the labor 
context). 
 37. 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948). 
 38. For criticisms of the Board’s reasoning in Babcock & Wilcox, see Secunda, supra 
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I. EMPLOYER CAPTIVE AUDIENCE SPEECH AND CONCEPTS OF COERCION 
A. The History of Board Treatment of Employer Captive Audience Speech 
In its initial form as the Wagner Act of 1935,
39
 the NLRA did not protect 
employer speech rights during an organizational campaign.
40
 As a result, most 
employers initially remained neutral while unions sought to organize their 
employees.
41
 Consequently, when the Board first specifically addressed the legality 
of employer captive audience speeches in the 1946 case of Clark Brothers Co.,
42
 it 
was not surprising that the Board adopted a rule that employer captive audience 
speeches during work time amounted to a per se violation of employee section 7 
rights to organize
43
:  
The Board has long recognized that “the rights guaranteed to 
employees by the Act include the full freedom to receive aid, advice, 
and information from others, concerning those rights and their 
enjoyment.” Such freedom is meaningless, however, unless the 
employees are also free to determine whether or not to receive such aid, 
advice, and information. To force employees to receive such aid, 
advice, and information impairs that freedom; it is calculated to, and 
does, interfere with the selection of a representative of the employees’ 
choice.
44
  
Because the mandatory attendance policy was not concerned with the company’s 
speech on unionization, the Board regulated the employer’s captive audience 
speech as inherently coercive.
45
 
This state of affairs quickly changed as a result of the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947.
46
 The Taft-Hartley Act recognized that employers expressly 
enjoy free speech protection for their noncoercive speech. Section 8(c) now 
provides: 
                                                                                                                 
note 6, at 409 (maintaining that “Babcock & Wilcox is simply irreconcilable with the Act’s 
policy of employee free choice”). 
 39. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006)). 
 40. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 356, 367 (1995) (“[D]uring the 1935 House 
debates on the Wagner Act, an amendment which would have guaranteed an employer’s 
right to free speech was rejected ‘as having no place in this bill.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935))). 
 41. See JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 94 (5th ed. 2006) 
(explaining that the Board under the Wagner Act took the position that any partisan 
employer involvement would inevitably interfere with the section 7 rights of employees). 
 42. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). 
 43. See id. at 804–05. 
 44. Id. at 805 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Harlan Fuel Company, 
8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938)).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–144, 167, 172–
187 (2006). 
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The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the 
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual 
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice 
under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression 
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
47
 
As a result of this language, and somewhat controversially, the Board reversed 
its Clark Brothers approach to captive audience speech and specifically found that 
the holding of such meetings did not violate section 8(a)(1).
48
 In coming to this 
holding, the Board merely stated that, “the language of section 8(c) of the amended 
Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. 
case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices [based on captive 
audience speeches].”49 Former NLRB Chairman William Gould has remarked that 
the shift in doctrine was done “reluctant[ly].”50 Yet, the Board has consistently, and 
as recently as 1998, refused to revisit its captive audience speech doctrine.
51
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. Id. at § 158(c) (emphasis added). 
 48. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). 
 49. Id. For a while after Babcock & Wilcox, unions were able to make similar speeches 
in reply. See Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 611 (1951). However, even this equal 
access rule was short-lived, and the Board reversed its course in Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 
N.L.R.B. 400, 406–09 (1953).  
 50. See Gould, supra note 5, at 484 n.111.  
 51. See id. (citing Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361 (1998) 
(Gould, Chairman, dissenting); see also Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, 326 N.L.R.B. at 352 
(Brame, Member, concurring) (“[T]he legislative history is explicit that, with the insertion of 
Section 8(c) in the law, Congress overruled the Board’s Clark Bros. Co. decision, in which 
the Board had banned employers from making noncoercive captive audience speeches.”). 
Member Brame, concurring in Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, stated the applicable precedent 
concerning employer speech and section 8(c) this way: 
1. An employer has the right to express its views about labor issues and 
unionization in noncoercive terms; put another way, Congress may not restrict 
an employer’s noncoercive speech. NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 
314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 
(1969); Section 8(c) of the Act; First Amendment, U.S. Constitution. 
 
2. [The employer’s] free speech right embraces the right to address employees 
in mandatory meetings held on company time without affording equal time to 
the union or to prounion employees. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400 
(1953); NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954); May Co. v. 
NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963); Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512 
(5th Cir. 1968); Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 319 (7th Cir. 
1995); see also Section 8(c) of the Act and its legislative history, S.Rep. No. 
105, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 23–24 (1947); 13 NLRB Ann. Rep. 49 (1948). 
Id. at 350 (formatting in original). I believe that pro-employer Board members and 
practitioners continue to see the applicable precedent and law in this matter. It is the 
second point that, for the reasons discussed below, I believe the Obama Board is ready 
to revisit. 
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B. The Threat and Benefit Clause Under Section 8(c)  
It would be another fifteen years after Taft-Hartley and the promulgation of 
section 8(c) before the U.S. Supreme Court gave its views about the meaning of the 
threat and benefit language and recognized employees’ heightened vulnerability to 
coercion in the context of employer promises during organizing campaigns. In the 
1964 case of NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the Boilermakers union told the 
company that it had majority support from the proposed bargaining unit, but the 
union ended up filing a petition for an election and an election was held.
52
  
Two weeks before the election, the company sent a letter in an envelope 
detailing all the benefits it had granted to employees since 1949, and further stated 
that “[t]he Union can’t put any of those things in your envelope–only the Company 
can do that.”53 The company also created “a new system for computing overtime 
during holiday weeks which had the effect of increasing wages for those weeks, 
and a new vacation schedule which enabled employees to extend their vacations.”54 
This short time before the election was the first time that the employer announced 
these changes in policies to benefit employees.
55
 Subsequently, the union ended up 
losing the election and filed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charges.
56
 The question 
presented to the U.S. Supreme Court concerned the scope of the Act’s limits on an 
employer’s ability to confer economic benefits on its employees shortly before a 
representation election.
57
 
The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.
58
 It reinstated the Board’s order that the 
employer’s conduct had coercively interfered with the employees’ organizational 
rights under section 7 of the Act, even though the increased wages and vacation 
benefits were granted unconditionally and on a permanent basis.
59
 Instead, it agreed 
with the Board that the employer conferred these new benefits to induce employees 
to vote against the union.
60
 The Court observed that section 8(a)(1) prohibits 
“conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express 
purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and 
is reasonably calculated to have that effect.”61 The famous and vivid phrase from 
the case further explained that “[t]he danger inherent in well-timed increases in 
benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”62  
Five years later, in the 1969 decision of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Court 
considered the contours of a nonprotected employer speech under the “threats” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. 375 U.S. 405, 406 (1964). 
 53. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“Although Exchange Parts asserts that the policy behind the latter two benefits 
was established earlier, it is clear that the letter of March 4 was the first general 
announcement of the changes to the employees.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 405–06. 
 58. Id. at 405. 
 59. Id. at 409–10. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 409. 
 62. Id. 
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clause in section 8(c).
63
 Gissel involved four consolidated cases raising common 
issues of alleged employer coercion during organizing campaigns.
64
 In one case, 
the Teamsters began to organize at two Sinclair-owned companies by obtaining 
authorization cards from eleven of the fourteen employees they sought to 
represent.
65
 The Teamsters demanded recognition based on having received 
authorization cards from the majority of bargaining unit members, but Sinclair 
refused to grant recognition.
66
 The Teamsters then petitioned for an election.
67
  
During the ensuing election campaign, Sinclair made references to a previous 
strike that resulted in the employees throwing out the union.
68
 The president of 
Sinclair also emphasized that election of the union could put Sinclair out of 
business, that the company was “on ‘thin ice’ financially,” and that reemployment 
would be difficult because of the employees’ ages and skills.69 Lastly, the president 
of Sinclair sent out threatening letters, which spoke ill of the Teamsters.
70
 After the 
union ended up losing the election by a vote of seven to six, it filed ULP charges 
and objections to set aside the election.
71
 
The Board held that Sinclair’s communications were reasonably understood to 
threaten loss of jobs if the union was elected, and therefore found a violation of 
section 8(a)(1).
72
 The Board also ordered the election to be set aside.
73
 The U.S. 
Supreme Court enforced the Board’s findings in Gissel and held that “an employer 
is free to communicate to [its] employees any of [its] general views about . . . a 
particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal 
or force or promise of benefit.’”74 Specifically, the Court observed that “an 
employer is free only to tell ‘what [it] reasonably believes will be the likely 
economic consequences of unionization that are outside [its] control,’ and not 
‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on [its] own volition.’”75  
In short, the Court made a distinction between an employer “prediction” and an 
employer “threat.” An employer may predict the likely effects it expects 
unionization to have on the company. The prediction, however, “must be carefully 
phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to 
demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a 
management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of 
unionization.”76  
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 587. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 587–88. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 588. 
 71. Id. at 589. 
 72. See id. at 589, 619–20. 
 73. Id. at 589. 
 74. Id. at 618. 
 75. Id. at 619 (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
 76. Id. at 618.  
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If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action 
solely on [its] own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic 
necessities and known only to [the employer], the statement is no 
longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of 
retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such 
without the protection of the First Amendment.
77
  
Thus, an employer must avoid conscious overstatements that will likely mislead its 
employees.
78
  
So at least since 1969, the Supreme Court has recognized that both threats of 
reprisal and promises of benefit by the employer during a representation election 
campaign coercively interfere with employees’ freedom to choose if they wish to 
unionize. Yet, the Board has chosen not to revisit its Babcock & Wilcox decision 
finding that employer captive audience speeches do not constitute coercive 
speech.
79
 This Article takes the view that, given the current membership of the 
Obama Board, a good chance exists that the Obama Board will re-examine how 
Exchange Parts and Gissel impact the future treatment by the Board of employer 
captive audience speech during union organizational campaigns.
80
 
So, why has the Board concluded that captive audience speeches are not 
inherently coercive, and thus subject to the threat and benefit language in the last 
clause of section 8(c)? Do that section and Supreme Court precedent not clearly 
state that employer free speech rights in the labor context are not absolute?
81
 
Section 8(c) expressly permits employers to state their opinions on unionization in 
a noncoercive fashion. The NLRA, however, does not permit employers to 
coercively force employees to attend non-work related meetings, and the statute 
does not grant employers the right to coercively force employees to attend meetings 
and listen to those views as unwilling participants.
82
 Clearly, one could argue, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 620. 
 79. See notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 80. The Board has only revisited the legality of employer captive audience meetings on 
a few occasions. For instance, in Litton Systems, Inc., the Board merely reiterated the same 
conclusory language found in Babcock & Wilcox: “[T]he Board has held as long ago as 
1948, that such a finding [of a ULP in a captive audience context] is barred by ‘the language 
of Section 8(c) of the amended Act and its legislative history.’” 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1031 
(1968) (quoting Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948)); see also F.W. 
Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980) (permitting an employer to exclude pro-
union employee’s from asking questions during captive audience meetings). It is interesting 
to note that although Exchange Parts had been decided when the Board decided Litton 
Systems, the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on the meaning of coercive threats 
by employers as it later would in the 1969 Gissel Packing case.  
 81. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (“Any assessment of the precise scope of employer 
expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an 
employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as 
those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by § 8(a)(1) and the proviso to § 8(c).”). 
 82. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 405 (1995) (“[T]he NLRB and the courts 
overlook and/or permit many election statements and interventions by employers which are, 
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other commentators already have,
83
 that the exceptions to section 8(c) for “threats 
of reprisal or force and promise of benefit” come into play and serve as another 
basis for limiting section 8(c) protections for employers who engage in captive 
audience speech.
84
 
There may not be a good explanation as to why Gissel has not yet been 
specifically applied to the captive audience setting and why the Board continues to 
adhere to the idea that Taft-Hartley unequivocally overturned the Clark Bros. 
doctrine.
85
 As I have analyzed in some detail in an earlier article, the legislative 
history of Taft-Hartley and the language of section 8(c) simply do not support such 
an unequivocal conclusion.
86
 In that previous article, I wrote: 
 As far as the phantom “legislative history” to which Babcock & 
Wilcox refers in deciding that Taft-Hartley permits captive audience 
meetings, one can make the educated guess that the Board was 
obliquely referring to statements made in the Senate Report during the 
Congressional debates over Taft-Hartley. Apparently, some legislators 
believed that Clark Bros. inappropriately “restricted” or “limited” the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. Collins, which held, among 
other things, that employers had the same speech rights as unions to 
talk about labor issues. Additionally, although the Senate Report on the 
Taft-Hartley Act specifically disapproved of Clark Bros., it only stated 
that the case stood for the proposition that employer speech was 
unlawful merely because it took place “in the plant on working time.” It 
appears though that the majority in Clark Bros. answered those same 
concerns when it responded to an argument by the dissenting Board 
member in Babcock & Wilcox: “We simply do not share his view that 
there is anything in the reasoning or language of the recent Supreme 
Court and Circuit Court decisions he cites [including Thomas v. 
Collins] which requires the Board to treat this particular respondent as 
though it had done no more than make an appeal to the reasoning 
faculties of its employees.” In other words, the Clark Bros. majority 
                                                                                                                 
in fact, coercive and which have a tendency, as a result, to chill the exercise of employee 
rights of self-organization.”). 
 83. Story believes that captive audience speech is a paradigmatic example of such 
unrecognized coercive interventions. See id. at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of an employer’s 
legally-sanctioned right to hold such captive audience meetings, to prevent the union from 
holding them, to forbid the asking of questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees 
who ask ‘loaded questions’ is a manifestation of coercive power and domination.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 84. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections 
and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 559 (1993) (“Although the Board ratified 
captive audience speeches on account of the free speech proviso, such conduct involves an 
element of coercion easily distinguishable from expression. The captive audience speech is 
diametrically opposed to the ‘free and open discussion’ the Board professes to promote.”). 
Of course, Member Becker is now a member of the Obama Board. 
 85. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (setting forth the common management 
reasoning underlying its unwillingness to regulate employer captive audience speeches in the 
labor context). 
 86. See Secunda, supra note 7, at 398–99 (describing in detail the threadbare nature of 
NLRB precedent in the captive audience speech area). 
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was responding to the coercive aspects of the captive audience 
meetings, not its speech elements. 
 . . . . 
 Of course, it goes without saying that there is a complete absence in 
the text of Section 8(c) itself of any language that could be read to 
mandate that the Board post-Taft Hartley overturn Clark Bros. Indeed, 
to the extent that the language of Section 8(c) is unambiguous in 
protecting employer speech in the labor context, canons of construction 
would suggest that it is inappropriate to look for further meaning from 
the statute in legislative pronouncements. In this regard, Justice Scalia 
has maintained: “We have repeatedly held that such reliance on 
[legislative history] is impermissible where, as here, the statutory 
language is unambiguous.” On the other hand, to the extent that the 
language of Section 8(c) could be deemed ambiguous, other 
contemporaneous legislative debates cast significant doubt on whether 
Section 8(c) was ever supposed to address the permissibility of captive 
audience meetings. In short, conclusory assertions aside concerning 
inapplicable provisions and mysterious legislative history, the Board 
appears to have remained free to uphold Clark Bros. even after the 
enactment of Section 8(c).
87
  
In the absence of more precise legislative history that Congress meant to leave 
employer captive audience speeches regulated, overturning Babcock & Wilcox 
would have the salubrious effect of “provid[ing] greater protection for employee 
free choice.”88 
The next two Parts consider how the Board might modify its captive audience 
doctrine if such a case comes to be decided. Part II considers a “laboratory 
conditions” election case, while Part III explores a potential unfair labor practice 
case under section 8(a)(1).  
II. THE LABORATORY CONDITIONS APPROACH: EXTENDING PEERLESS PLYWOOD 
In the 1948 case of General Shoe Corp., shortly after the enactment of Taft-
Hartley, the Board held that section 8(c) only applies in ULP cases, not election 
cases.
89
 As a result, the Board can set aside and order new elections for 
communication or conduct that does not constitute a ULP (like coercive speech), 
but still makes an election unfair because the conduct interferes with an employee’s 
ability to decide freely if he or she desires union representation. 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court and Board have repeatedly observed the 
centrality of employee free choice under the NLRA. As recently, as Chamber of 
Commerce v. Brown, both the U.S. Supreme Court
90
 and the Board
91
 have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Id. at 395–97 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 88. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 438 (2007) (using the same reasoning to 
overturn the forty-year-old voluntary recognition bar doctrine). 
 89. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 n.10 (1948).  
 90. See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996) (discussing the 
NLRA’s “command to respect ‘the free choice of employees’” to select bargaining 
representatives (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 
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repeatedly emphasized the NLRA’s policy in favor of employee free choice. In 
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,
92
 the Court addressed whether a California 
statute was preempted by the NLRA where the statute prohibited employers who 
receive state funds from using those funds to promote or deter organization.
93
 In the 
process of holding that the statute was preempted by the NLRA,
94
 Justice Stevens 
reaffirmed that the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrated Congressional intent to favor 
representation elections because employee free choice can be thereby assured.
95
 
To determine if employees are being permitted to exercise free choice when 
voting in favor of or against union representation, the Board created in General 
Shoe Corp. the “laboratory conditions” test: 
In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function to provide a 
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions 
as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the 
employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our 
duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the rare 
extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of 
others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the 
experiment must be conducted over again.
96
 
In short, General Shoe held that communications during union campaigns do not 
constitute an unfair labor practice. Rather, because the employer had interfered 
with employee free choice, the Board ordered that the election be rerun.  
Shortly thereafter, the Board applied the General Shoe doctrine to captive 
audience speeches. Under Peerless Plywood, neither employers nor unions may 
make captive meeting speeches to massed groups of employees within twenty-four 
hours of an election.
97
 In that case, the Board stated that it was “institut[ing] [the 
                                                                                                                 
38 (1987))); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 607–08 (1969) (discussing the 
Board’s obligation to ensure employee free choice in the use of authorization cards); NLRB 
v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (holding that section 8(a)(1) prohibits 
employer conduct that inhibits employees freedom of choice); Garment Workers’ Union v. 
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) (“[T]he Wagner Act guarantees employees’ freedom of 
choice and majority rule.”); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99–100 (1954) (observing that 
secret ballot union representation elections safeguard employee free choice). 
 91. See, e.g., Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 441 (2007) (“[Employee] free choice is, 
after all, the fundamental value protected by the Act.”); Madison Square Garden Ct., LLC, 
350 N.L.R.B. 117 117, 119 (2007) (setting aside the representation election because a 
supervisor’s conduct coerced and interfered with employee free choice); Electromation, Inc., 
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 993 (1992) (discussing the Wagner Act’s ban on employer dominated 
labor organizations as furthering Congress’ goal of promoting employee free choice when 
selecting a labor organization); Midland Nat’l Life Ins., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) 
(recognizing that deceptive practices that interfere with employee free choice are grounds to 
set an election aside). 
 92. 554 U.S. 60 (2008). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 66. 
 95. See id. at 74 (“The NLRB has policed a narrow zone of speech to ensure free and 
fair elections under the aegis of § 9 of the NLRA . . . .”). 
 96. 77 N.L.R.B. at 127 (footnote omitted). 
 97. 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953). See also Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 
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twenty-four-hour] rule pursuant to [its] statutory authority and obligation to 
conduct elections in circumstances and under conditions which will insure 
employees a free and untrammeled choice.”98 
After Peerless Plywood, objectionable employer conduct was extended to apply 
to additional captive speech situations. For example, two years after Peerless 
Plywood, in Economic Machinery Co.,
99
 the Board held that “the technique of 
calling the employees into the Employer’s office individually” is itself “conduct 
calculated to interfere with . . . free choice . . . regardless of the noncoercive tenor 
of an employer’s actual remarks.”100 So, to the extent that the captive audience 
speech involves a one-on-one conversation between a supervisor and an employee 
concerning the union, Board law appears to favor finding a violation of the 
election’s laboratory conditions. 
But going even further than that, the Board expanded its doctrine on captive 
audience speeches in the laboratory conditions context where the employer sought 
to meet with small groups of employees on its terms and in its territory. For 
instance, in NVF Co., the Board found employer conduct objectionable “where it 
can be said on reasonable grounds that, because of the small size of the groups 
interviewed, the locus of the interview, the position of the interviewer in the 
employer’s hierarchy, and the tenor of the speaker’s remarks” the employee is no 
longer able to freely express his or her wishes concerning union representation.
101
  
Now, it is true that in the 1958 case of Mead-Atlanta Paper Co.,
102
 the Board 
held that large group meetings, like the modern captive audience meetings of today, 
do not have the same coercive influence as one-on-one meetings or the smaller 
meetings described in NVF. According to the Board in Mead-Atlanta, this is 
because “[w]hen employees are gathered . . . in open areas of the plant . . . there 
results free and open discussion with both management and employees enjoying the 
confidences and assurances which are normal aspects of collective and group 
activities.”103 Of course, the last fifty years of experience have been filled with 
cases in which employees are not permitted to engage in a “free and open 
discussion” with their employer about unionization and, in fact, may be terminated 
from employment if they seek to speak or wish to leave the meeting.
104
 Surely, the 
                                                                                                                 
408 (1953) (“The rule laid down in Peerless Plywood is a rule of conduct governing Board 
elections and, in our opinion, constitutes a narrow and reasonable limitation designed to 
facilitate the holding of free elections in the atmosphere of relative tranquility conducive to a 
sober choice of representative.”). 
 98. Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. at 429. 
 99. 111 N.L.R.B. 947 (1955). 
 100. Id. at 948. 
 101. 210 N.L.R.B. 663, 664 (1974); see also Flex Products, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1117, 
1118 (1986). 
 102. 120 N.L.R.B. 832 (1958). 
 103. Id. at 833. 
 104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 8, 10–11 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(refusing to enforce an NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning 
during a captive audience meeting constituted an unfair labor practice); Litton Sys., Inc., 173 
N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (stating that an employee has no statutorily protected right to 
leave a mandatory anti-union captive audience meeting); Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 
806, 811–12, 815 (1967) (upholding an employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union workers 
who speak out once captive audience meetings have begun). 
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Board should be free now to rely upon fifty years of industrial experience post-
Mead-Atlanta to conclude that the Board was previously wrong in finding that 
larger meetings would foster free and open discussion. Indeed, it is well within the 
discretion of the Board to find “as a matter of industrial experience” that the 
policies of the Act are not effectuated by allowing unfettered employer captive 
audience speeches to large groups of employees in the critical period before the 
election.
105
 
More recently, current Board doctrine treats communications by pro-union 
supervisors as similarly coercive as that speech made by anti-union supervisors. 
The Board found in Harborside Health Care, Inc. that such speech is capable of 
leading to a General Shoe laboratory conditions test violation.
106
 Although the 
Board made clear that supervisor pro-union speech is not objectionable in and of 
itself,
107
 the 3-2 Republican majority reaffirmed long-held Board precedent that 
pro-union supervisory conduct may be grounds for setting aside an election without 
there being an explicit threat of reprisal or promise of benefit.
108
 More specifically, 
the Board adopted a rule that supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards 
is inherently coercive absent mitigating circumstances.
109
 More recent holdings 
suggesting that management agents have more rights to coerce employees in this 
regard are simply wrong.
110
  
As far as what the Obama Board might do if an election case with employer 
captive audience speeches arises, the Board may move to set aside such an election 
if the captive audience meeting occurs close in time to the actual election. The 
proximity of the employer speech to the election is an important consideration, 
since if the union has an effective chance to respond to the employer’s views on 
unionization, the coercive nature of the employer speech may be minimized. Thus, 
it is possible that the Board will seek not to completely ban such captive audience 
speeches as inherently coercive. Rather, the Board may expand the Peerless 
Plywood period to reflect modern-day realities as far as how likely it will be that 
the union can effectively respond, outside of the workplace, to the employer’s 
captive audience speech.  
One possibility as far as extending the no-captive-speech time period would be 
an approach based on the realities of the fast-paced, technologically driven 
workplaces of the twenty-first century, in which employees are inundated with vast 
amounts of workplace information. In such modern-day workplaces, a different 
standard may be necessary to assure that the union can respond to the employer’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958). 
 106. See Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 916 (2004) (reversing precedent 
and liberalizing standard for finding pro-union supervisory conduct objectionable in context 
of representation elections). 
 107. Id. at 911. 
 108. Id. at 909. 
 109. Id. at 911. 
 110. See, e.g., Aladdin Gaming, L.L.C., 345 N.L.R.B. 585 (2005) (finding lawful a 
management official’s interruption of off-duty employees’ conversation about signing union 
authorization cards); Werthan Packaging, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 343 (2005) (finding no 
objectionable election conduct where manager interrogated employee and stated that voting 
for union was not in best interests of employee and her family). 
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speech to the employee in a meaningful way. A larger buffer zone between captive 
audience speeches and the holding of an election would also give employees the 
necessary time to digest the information provided by both the employer and 
employee. A shorter buffer zone between captive audience meetings and the 
election would tip the scales unfairly in the employer’s favor. 
The need for a longer time without captive audience speeches before election is 
also supported by the observation that many employees live far away from work. 
Board law is clear that unions, unlike employers, are generally not permitted to 
give speeches to employees at the workplace.
111
 Even if the union does possess a 
hall or meeting space, an employer’s right to give speeches at the workplace is a 
tremendous advantage in the modern-day workplace, where it is difficult for unions 
to gather far-flung employees after work.
112
 One way to provide the union a 
meaningful time to reply to employer captive audience speech is to not permit any 
captive audience speeches a week or two before the election. To paraphrase 
Livingston Shirt Corp., a Board case decided the same year as Peerless Plywood, 
such an extension would still “constitute[] a narrow and reasonable limitation 
designed to facilitate the holding of free elections in the atmosphere of relative 
tranquility conducive to a sober choice of representative.”113  
Moreover, for the reasons discussed in Members Liebman and Walsh’s dissent 
in Guard Publishing Co.,
114
 I think the Board is likely to view new workplace 
realities as requiring additional protections to allow employees to exercise free 
choice. In Guard Publishing Co., the Board considered whether the employer 
violated section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a policy prohibiting the use of e-mail for all 
“non-job-related solicitations.”115 The Board held, in a 3-2 decision, that “the . . . 
employees have no statutory right to use the [employer’s] e-mail system for Section 
7 purposes,” and, therefore, the policy did not violate section 8(a)(1).116 The case 
came down to the Board majority’s conclusion that “where the Board has addressed 
whether employees have the right to use other types of employer-owned property—
such as bulletin boards, telephones, and televisions—for Section 7 
communications, the Board has consistently held that there is ‘no statutory 
right . . . to use an employer’s equipment or media,’ as long as the restrictions are 
nondiscriminatory.”117 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
 112. See Story, supra note 82, at 380 (“To equate heavy-handed union tactics of 
pressuring an employee to sign a union card with the range of tactics available to employers 
(e.g., firing, suspension, failure to promote, favoritism in work assignments, and so on) or to 
equate the ‘rough and tumble’ of some union halls and a union shop contract with 
hierarchical workplace relationships is to operate from a truly impoverished understanding 
of employer coercion and from a false assumption that unions and employer are 
equivalent . . . .”).  
 113. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 408 (1953). 
 114. 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121–32 (2007). 
 115. Id. at 1111. 
 116. Id. at 1110. 
 117. Id. at 1114 (quoting Mid-Mountain Foods 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000)). 
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Members Liebman and Walsh observed in the Guard Publishing dissent that 
e-mail has revolutionized communication within the workplace.
118
 In a theme that 
Chairman Liebman later discussed in more detail in an academic article she 
penned, she and Member Walsh observed in the dissent to Guard Publishing Co. 
that e-mail has revolutionized business and personal communications. Liebman and 
Walsh argued that, by failing to carve out an exception for e-mail to settled 
principles regarding use of employer property, the Board was failing to adapt the 
Act to the changing patterns of industrial life and had thus become the “Rip Van 
Winkle of administrative agencies.”119 Although captive audience speeches do not 
generally involve the use of e-mail as in Guard Publishing Co., Democratic 
members of the Board have shown a willingness to change existing rules to reflect 
the changing realities of the new workplace. They assert that “[n]ational labor 
policy must be responsive to the enormous technological changes that are taking 
place in our society,”120 and that there exists a “responsibility to adapt the Act to 
changing patterns of industrial life.”121 Other changing patterns of industrial life 
include the increasing mobility of the workforce and the fact that employees tend 
not to remain for long periods of times in the same facility or with the same 
employer, traveling to many different locations in short periods of time.
122
 
All of this suggests that a Democratic Board majority may decide to extend the 
Peerless Plywood period to make it less likely that employer captive audience 
speeches close to the election would undermine the laboratory conditions of the 
election. The longer the Peerless Plywood period, the better the chance that the 
union will have adequate time to craft a meaningful reply to the employer that most 
of the employees will be likely to hear.
123
 The Board should be able to make this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Id. at 1121. Chairman Liebman later wrote about this theme in more detail: 
In this historical context, American labor law, enacted when the prototypical 
workplace was the factory, and the rotary telephone was “the last word in 
desktop technology,” increasingly appears out of sync with changing workplace 
realities. Yet the Board itself has made little sustained effort to adjust its legal 
doctrines to preserve worker protections in a ruthlessly competitive economy. 
In short, labor law policymakers and enforcers have done too little, too late. 
Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 576 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
 119. Guard Publishing Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, 
dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1125 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)). 
 122. See Liebman, supra note 118, at 573–74. 
 123. Alternatively, the Board could reduce the incidence of captive audience speeches by 
reducing the time period between the filing of the election petition and the holding of the 
election. As of the writing of this Article, the Board has just introduced proposed rules that 
would shorten the campaign period. See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would 
Streamline Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/business/22labor.html (“In a move that pleased labor 
unions, the National Labor Relations Board proposed new rules on Tuesday to speed up 
unionization elections.”). 
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change consistent with its role of modifying Board doctrine to address the 
complexities surrounding modern industrial relations.
124
 
III. THE ULP APPROACH: REVITALIZING THE THREATS AND BENEFITS CLAUSE OF 
SECTION 8(C) 
Of course, a case may not come to the Board as an election objection based on 
the laboratory conditions approach, but it may come as a more traditional ULP 
based on coercive employer communications.
125
 In this circumstance, the Board 
would need to reexamine
126
 its sixty-year-old Babcock & Wilcox Co. decision, 
which held captive-audience speeches to be permissible,
127
 in light of the more 
recent Supreme Court decisions in Exchange Parts and Gissel.
128
  
Actually, even before Exchange Parts and Gissel, evidence was available in 
1948, when the Board issued Babcock & Wilcox, that a more searching inquiry 
beyond Taft-Hartley should have been completed, including whether the speech 
during a captive audience meeting was coercive (as far as containing an explicit 
threat or promise) and, therefore, not protected under section 8(c).  
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1945 case of Thomas v. Collins,
129
 
could not have been clearer about the limits of employer free speech. Justice 
Rutledge, writing for the majority in Thomas, stated with regard to the right to 
persuade by speech: “When to this persuasion other things are added which bring 
about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the [employer’s First 
Amendment] right has been passed.”130 Justice Douglas concurred, stating: “[O]nce 
[a person] uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to 
influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he is an employer or an 
employee.”131  
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See Secunda, supra note 17, at 56 (“By placing the enforcement mechanism of the 
Act within the NLRB, Congress expected that experienced officials with an adequate 
appreciation of the complexities surrounding industrial relations would make the decisions 
that would shape national labor policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 125. I leave to my previous articles the observation that speech alone is not what is solely 
objectionable here, but the conduct of forcing employees to listen at pain of being fired for 
not attending the meeting or not complying with the meeting’s ground rules. See generally 
Secunda, supra note 6; Secunda, supra note 7. 
 126. See supra note 7, at 406 (“Board precedent is not sacrosanct, especially where the 
initial Board decision is not supported by a modicum of reasoned elaboration.”). 
 127. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). 
 128. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (“The danger inherent in 
well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.”); NLRB 
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619 (1969) (“[A]n employer is free only to tell ‘what he 
reasonably believes will be the likely economic consequences of unionization that are 
outside his control’ and not ‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own 
volition.’” (quoting NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967)).  
 129. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 130. Id. at 537–38 (footnote omitted). 
 131. Id. at 543–44 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Additionally, the Trial Examiner in the Babcock & Wilcox case discussed the 
coercive nature of such captive audience speeches. Specifically, in finding a section 
8(a)(1) violation, he observed: 
 Standing individually, [the employer’s] statements in his speeches to 
the employees . . . though openly anti-Union, contain no language that 
on the surface exceeds the bounds of free speech. If they constitute a 
violation of the Act, it is because coercion is to be imputed to them 
from the circumstances under which they were uttered and which affect 
their meaning.
132
  
This insight is strikingly similar to the one made in Gissel some twenty years later 
when the Court wrote with regard to threatening, coercive speech: “[A]ny 
balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the 
employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because 
of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be 
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”133 
Thus, the Trial Examiner based his decision of illegality on the contextual and 
coercive nature of the captive audience speech. The Trial Examiner found that the 
employer exploited its ability to control employees during working hours by 
stressing its superior economic position.
134
  
Under an approach more consistent with Gissel and Exchange Parts, the Board 
would more closely scrutinize challenges to employer speeches made in a captive 
audience setting to determine the coercive nature of the speech under the specific 
circumstances of the case. Additionally, it appears that this Board may be more 
willing than past Boards to pay closer attention to the realities on the ground as 
opposed to more formal concepts of free choice.
135
 Such an approach would 
recognize how the power disparities between the parties
136
 and the lack of equal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. at 595. 
 133. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617. 
 134. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. at 578 (“With respect to the ‘compulsory audience’ 
aspect of the speeches, the Trial Examiner concluded from all the evidence that the notices 
of the meetings as well as the oral instructions given to the employees concerning these 
meetings removed the element of choice from the employees and, in effect, compelled them 
to attend in violation of the Act.”). 
 135. See Liebman, supra note 118, at 580 (“Increasingly, the Board has adopted a 
formalistic approach to interpreting the law, turning away from the real world and the 
challenges it poses for labor policy. This approach threatens to result in a loss of confidence 
in the Board’s decisionmaking, not simply in terms of the results reached, but also in the way 
those results are reached.” (footnote omitted)). 
 136. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (“[A]ny balancing of [section 8(a)(1) and 8(c)] rights 
must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and 
the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended 
implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”); 
see also NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Employees during working hours are the classic 
captive audience.”); Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist 
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (“Few audiences are 
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union access to the workplace make these employer speeches hypercoercive.
137
 As 
such, the Board might be willing to apply a presumption of coercion if employees 
are subject to coercive ground rules during such meetings, like the inability to 
decide to leave the meeting if it becomes coercive or the inability to interact and 
question the employer’s speakers.138 Such a presumption would also be based on 
the proposition that such conditions on employer speech do not interfere with the 
right to engage in noncoercive speech under section 8(c). After all, rights to free 
speech do not carry with them the right to compel unwilling employees to listen.
139
 
As an evidentiary presumption, the employer would still be given a chance to 
rebut that presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
captive audience tactic did not interfere with the section 7 organizational rights of 
employees. Here, I suggest that the Board could borrow from existing Board law in 
the area of employee polling to show that their captive audience speech did not 
devolve into an intimidating or coercive environment in violation of the Act.  
In NLRB v. Lorben Corp., a company’s plant superintendent polled employees 
to see if they wished to be represented by a union.
140
 Although the Second Circuit 
majority found that the employer speech was not intimidating or coercive on its 
face,
141
 Judge Friendly wrote a persuasive opinion in dissent. There, he wrote that, 
when an employer sets into motion a formal tabulation, it is not much to ask that he 
provide some explanation and assure his employees of no reprisals for their truthful 
answers.
142
  
A couple years later, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted Judge Friendly’s 
approach to pre-election employee polling. In Struksnes Construction Co.,
143
 the 
owner of a construction company personally solicited signatures of employees as to 
                                                                                                                 
more captive than the average worker.”). 
 137. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (employer may 
prohibit non-employee union solicitation on its property unless the location of the plant is so 
remote that the union is unable to communicate with employees through its own reasonable 
efforts); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538–39 (1992) (holding that the 
Babcock inaccessibility exception is narrow and generally only applies to remote locations 
such as logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels). 
 138. The adoption of the employer coercion presumption would effectively overturn 
Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (indicating that employee has no 
statutorily protected right to leave a mandatory anti-union captive audience meeting); NLRB 
v. Prescott Indus. Products Co., 500 F.2d 6, 10–11 (8th Cir. 1974) (refusing to enforce an 
NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning during a captive audience 
meeting constituted an unfair labor practice); and Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 815 
(1967) (upholding an employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union workers who speak out once 
captive audience meetings have begun). 
 139. See Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a 
right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 537–38 (1945) (finding that employers may have a right to persuade their employees, 
but “[w]hen to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it 
that character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has been passed.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 140. 345 F.2d 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 349 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 143. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).  
2012] FUTURE NLRB DOCTRINE 145 
 
 
whether they wished to be represented by the union.
144
 The employer did not 
explain his purposes or promise no reprisal against employees voting for the union. 
Reversing the Board, the court believed that coercion was inherent in such polling 
and therefore directed the NLRB to develop appropriate policy considerations and 
to outline minimal standards to govern polling on union preferences. 
On remand, the Board adopted the following five prong standard: 
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an 
employer will be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the 
following safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to 
determine the truth of a union’s claim of majority, (2) this purpose is 
communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are 
given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the 
employer has not engaged in [ULPs] or otherwise created a coercive 
atmosphere.
145
 
The Struksnes standards for polling could readily be modified to ensure that 
captive audience speeches do not become coercive. First, the purpose of the captive 
audience speech would have to be to noncoercively inform employees of their 
employers’ view on unionism in accordance with section 8(c). Second, that purpose 
must be communicated to employees during the captive audience speech. Third, the 
employer must assure employees that by asking questions or otherwise indicating 
pro-union views during such meetings, that no reprisal will be taken against them. 
The fourth prong of the Struksnes test would not apply in the captive audience 
context as it specifically involves the nature of polling activity. Finally, under the 
fifth prong of the current Struksnes test (and what would be the fourth factor under 
the modified test), the employer would have to show that the captive audience 
speech did not creative a coercive environment. This could be readily done by 
permitting employees to speak during the meeting and by allowing employees to 
leave during the meeting without reprisal if they believe the meeting has become 
coercive or threatening. 
In all, given the potentially coercive nature of captive audience meetings, the 
employer should have to meet a fairly high standard to convince a factfinder that 
such a meeting is consistent with employees being able to freely choose to join a 
union. One approach the Obama Board may adopt is the modified Struksnes 
standard to ensure that employee section 7 rights in this context are preserved. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article maintains that the Obama Board is likely to revisit the captive 
audience speech doctrine for the first time in decades. Because of modern 
workplace realities, the use of captive audience speeches by employers has become 
highly effective in interfering with the free choice rights of employees to decide 
whether to be represented by a union. Employees now deserve an extra layer of 
protection from this coercive employer tactic. To be clear, these are not normal 
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staff meetings—the kind where everyone in the office gets together once a week 
and discusses something like organizational philosophy. These are out-of-the-
ordinary, all-hands-on-deck meetings that simply terrify many employees, who are 
not able to leave or speak and who face termination if they break the employer’s 
draconian ground rules.  
The response of the Obama Board will likely depend on whether the future case 
presents itself as primarily an election case or one that also involves an allegation 
of an unfair labor practice. If an election case, the Board is more likely to expand 
the Peerless Plywood doctrine to provide additional insulation for employee free 
choice in light of modern workplace realities involving fast-paced and technology-
driven workplaces and more widely dispersed labor forces.  
If a union raises the captive audience speech issue in a case alleging a section 
8(a)(1) ULP, the Board might reexamine its precedent and consider when exactly 
employer captive audience speech tactics become coercive under Exchange Parts 
and Gissel. This approach would require a more searching inquiry into the content 
of the speech. It might also lead the Board to adopt a presumption of employer 
coercion where employees are unable to leave such a meeting or ask questions of 
the employer’s representative. An employer would be able to rebut such a 
presumption under a modified form of the Struksnes polling standards that would 
make clear the purpose of such meetings and assure employees against retaliation 
for not adhering to the employer’s anti-union message. 
